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Abstract 
The credential delegation protocol allows a client program to delegate a user's 
credentials to a service such that that service may make requests of other 
services in the name of that user. The protocol defines a REST service that 
works alongside other IVO services to enable such a delegation in a secure 
manner.  In addition to defining the specifics of the service protocol, this 
document describes how a delegation service is registered in an IVOA registry 
along with the services it supports.  The specification also explains how one can 
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determine from a service registration that it requires the use of a supporting 
delegation service. 
Status of This Document 
This is an IVOA Recommendation made available for public reference. The first 
release of this document was 2008 September 23. 
This document has been produced by the IVOA Grid and Web Services Working 
Group. 
It has been reviewed by IVOA Members and other interested parties, and has 
been endorsed by the IVOA Executive Committee as an IVOA Recommendation. 
It is a stable document and may be used as reference material or cited as a 
normative reference from another document. IVOA's role in making the 
Recommendation is to draw attention to the specification and to promote its 
widespread deployment. This enhances the functionality and interoperability 
inside the Astronomical Community. 
A list of current IVOA Recommendations and other technical documents can be 
found at http://www.ivoa.net/Documents/.  
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resources that can be used to conduct astronomical research, education, and 
outreach. The International Virtual Observatory Alliance (IVOA) is a global 
collaboration of separately funded projects to develop standards and 
infrastructure that enable VO applications. The International Virtual Observatory 
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(IVO) application is an application that takes advantage of IVOA standards and 
infrastructure to provide some VO service. 
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1 Introduction 
Some services in the VO have restricted access; some users have access rights. 
When a client program makes a request to one of these secured services, it is 
typically doing so in the name of the user running the client, i.e. the client 
presents to the service credentials authenticating the user's identity. 
“Presents to the service credentials” means that the client sends the public 
credentials (an X.509 certificate) but not the private credentials (the private key 
matching the public key in the certificate). The client authenticates its right to use 
the identity in the certificate by proving that it holds the private key. It does this 
using one of the approved authentication methods [1], either Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) or digital signature. 
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Now consider a secured service -- call it the “agent” -- which needs to drive other 
secured services. This might be a “broker” service accessing restricted archives, 
or it might be a DAL service storing query results in VOSpace. The agent has the 
certificate for the user's identity but it does not have the private key, so it cannot 
authenticate the user's identity. 
To proceed to operate on the user's behalf, the agent needs to get a private key. 
Sending the user's own private key across the network is too dangerous and 
vulnerable to interception. The alternative, on which this IVOA delegation 
protocol is based, is to generate a proxy identity tied to the user's identity, with a 
certificate based on a key pair generated by the agent. The agent can then 
authenticate the proxy identity to other services. Those other services recognize 
a proxy identity by the annotations in its certificate and accord it the same access 
rights as the primary identity from which the proxy is derived. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Recipe for creating a proxy certificate so that an agent may access another 
service with the client's identity. 
 
This method of delegation, summarized in Fig. 1, is called “delegation by 
impersonation” and is common in grid computing [2].   
The certificate for a proxy identity is commonly called a proxy certificate or simply 
“a proxy”. IETF RFC 3820 [3] defines the content and encoding of these 
certificates.   
The subject or “distinguished name” (DN) in a proxy certificate is formed by 
adding an additional CN field to the DN of certificate from which it is derived.  The 
value of the added CN can be any legal DN string, but is typically unique to the 
usage context (e.g. user session).  For example, if an end-entity certificate (EEC; 
the long-term certificate issued to a user) authenticates the identity represented 
by the DN, 
 C=UK, O=AstroGrid, OU=IoA Cambridge, CN=Guy Rixon,  
then a proxy certificate made from this will authenticate  
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 C=UK, O=AstroGrid, OU=IoA Cambridge, CN=Guy Rixon, CN=183103. 
To trust the identity in a certificate, an entity must be able to trace a chain of 
signatures back to a trust anchor. When a proxy certificate is made from an EEC, 
then the EEC becomes part of this chain. Therefore, whenever a proxy is sent to 
a service to authenticate an identity, the EEC from which the proxy is derived 
must also be sent.   
A proxy certificate may be derived from another proxy instead of directly from an 
EEC, in which case it the DN will include multiple added CN fields. This is normal 
in the VO, since many desktop applications get their credentials as proxies; they 
never see a private key matching an EEC.  Regardless of how many proxies 
appear in the credentials presented for authentication to the service, the 
delegation process establishes what we refer to as a delegated identity on the 
server; that delegated identity is represented by a DN that matches the DN in the 
EEC at the end of the certificate chain.   
Note that in IVOA protocols, a client must delegate credentials before calling a 
service that needs to use delegated credentials. The client can find out the need 
for delegation from the service registration. 
The delegation process that provides a delegated identity to the agent has these 
steps: 
1. The client commands the agent to generate and store a key pair for a 
particular identity. 
2. The client retrieves from the agent a certificate signing request (CSR) 
containing the public key. 
3. The client generates from the CSR a certificate, signs it and gives the 
certificate to the agent. 
4. The agent securely stores the certificate.   
Once the agent has a proxy certificate, the client is ready to access the secured 
service.  The client authenticates with the service, and the service matches the 
EEC identity of the client with a stored proxy that it can use on the client’s behalf 
to access other services.     
All client requests during the delegation process must be authenticated, and the 
server must only allow a client to access credentials corresponding to its own 
delegated identity.  In principle, authentication can be accomplished either via the  
TLS-with-client-certificate method [11], i.e. by HTTPS, or via digital signatures on 
the message bodies (in order to be compliant with the IVOA authentication 
standard [1]).  This version of the delegation protocol standard specifically 
requires the TLA-based method on HTTPS URLs using RESTful operations.  A 
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future version may address a SOAP-based interface using digital signatures 
whose design will follow very close to the one outlined here.   
2 Delegation protocol 
2.1 Required web resources 
2.1.1 Specification 
The delegation protocol is RESTful and is enabled via a set of four service 
components that are each accessible via a URL which we refer to as web 
resources, each representing information accessible to the client through the 
course of the delegation process.  In particular, an agent that needs to receive 
proxy credentials must provide four types of web resources accessible by HTTP 
that represent the following: 
WR1. a single resource per delegation agent representing a list of the 
available delegated identities. 
WR2. a delegated identity, one for each in the identities list.  
WR3. a certificate signing request (CSR), one for each identity. 
WR4. a proxy certificate, one for each identity. 
Only WR1, the list of delegated identities, is represented by a static URL, always 
available as long as the delegation agent is on-line.  The others are created 
dynamically through the course of the protocol.  In this document, a web 
resource is said to exist or be available if a properly authenticated and authorized 
GET request to the resource's URL will return a successful response. 
The form of the URL for WR1 can have any path component (the portion 
following the server's domain name [10]) but it must not include a query 
component (i.e. a component following a question mark, “?”) nor a fragment 
component (I.e. a component following a pound sign, “#”). 
Example: Legal and illegal URLs for the list of delegated identities (WR1): 
Legal: 
http://mysite.net/cgi-bin/delegationService 
http://mysite.net/delegations 
Illegal: 
http://mysite.net/cgi-bin/delegationService?res=data 
http://mysite.net/delegations#list 
The forms of the URLs for the other resources reflect parent-child relationship 
between the resources.  The URL of a so-called child resource is composed of 
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the URL of the parent resource appended with an additional path.  The URLs of 
these resources must satisfy the following constraints on their paths: 
 WR2, a delegated identity, must be a child of WR1, the list of identities. 
 WR3, the CSR, must be a child of its delegated identity (WR2), and the 
additional path must be set to CSR. 
 WR4, the certificate, must be a child of its delegated identity (WR2), and 
the additional path must be set to certificate. 
Example:  
A successful delegation process might interact with the following four specific 
resources: 
1. delegated identities list:   https://mysite.net/delegations 
2. the delegated identity:     https://mysite.net/delegations/A328FE83D0 
3. the CSR:                          https://mysite.net/delegations/A328FE83D0/CSR 
4. the proxy certificate:        https://mysite.net/delegations/A328FE83D0/certificate  
 
Note:  
The resources for the identities can have any name, but that name should be easy to 
encode into the URL; X.500 DNs, as taken from the certificates, are hard to read when 
URL-encoded and evoke privacy concerns if incorporated into URLs (see next 
section).   A better choice is a hash of the DN that is unique within the delegation 
service. Java implementations that cache an object for each identity can use the result 
of the hashcode() method to name the identity resource. 
 
2.2 Representations of resources 
When one of the web resources is accessed via a GET operation on its URL, it 
returns a representation of the resource.  This section describes those 
representations.   
There is no required representation for WR1, the list of delegated identities.  It is 
expected that GET operations on this resource would be primarily for debugging 
purposes; thus, the representation should be human-readable.  When human-
readable, a returned MIME-type of text/plain is recommended.  The 
representation should include a listing of the URLs for the delegated identities 
currently in scope on the server.  
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The representation of WR2, the delegated identity, must be the identity's 
distinguished name (DN) formatted as a string according to RFC 2253 [9] and 
returned with a MIME-type of text/plain.   
Note:  
For concerns of security and privacy, it is recommended that the representation of 
WR1, list of delegated identities not contain any information that can be used to 
ascertain the true identities of the users they represent.  In particular, the WR1 
representation should not list WR2 URLs if those URLs can be easily converted back 
into distinguished names.  A unique but randomized name used in WR1 would be best 
at protecting privacy.  If a disconnection between the WR2 URLs and the users' DNs 
cannot be made, the representation of WR1 could simply give the number of active 
identities in scope. 
WR3, the certificate signing request (CSR), must be represented as a PKCS#10  
[4] CSR with PEM encoding.  (“PEM encoding” means that the text of the 
credential is written out as a byte stream according to the Distinguished 
Encoding Rules [7] of ASN.1 [8] and that stream is re-encoded in base 64.) 
WR4, the proxy certificate, must be represented as an X.509v3 [5, 6] certificate 
with PEM encoding. More specifically, the certificate must be a proxy certificate 
following the rules of RFC 3820 [3]. The proxyPolicy field of the certificate must 
be set to the special value id-ppl-inheritAll, as defined in section 3.8.2 of RFC 
3820. 
Note:  
The above proxyPolicy constraint means that the proxy identity represented by the 
certificate inherits all access rights of the identity from which it is derived; this kind of 
proxy certificate is colloquially called an “impersonation proxy”. 
 
Example:  
Suppose, for example, that the client holds a certificate chain containing certificates with 
these subjects: 
C=UK, O=AstroGrid, OU=Cambridge, CN=Guy Rixon 
C=UK, O=AstroGrid, OU=Cambridge, CN=Guy Rixon, CN=12345678 
where the former is an EEC and the latter is a proxy certificate signed with the private 
key matching the EEC. The subject of the EEC is the delegated identity itself; this is the 
string returned as the representation of the identity resource. The certificate web 
resource will then be a further proxy certificate for,  e.g. 
C=UK, O=AstroGrid, OU=Cambridge, CN=Guy Rixon, CN=12345678, CN=9876543 
signed by the key matching the client's original proxy. 
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2.3 Operations on the resources 
In this section, we detail the operations necessary for creating and using a proxy 
identity.  In particular, we specify the required behavior of each of the operations.  
Figure 2 summarizes the complete sequence for the entire delegation process.   
 
Figure 2:  The sequence of operations for creating and using a proxy identity. 
2.3.1 Establishing a delegated identity 
Identity delegation is accomplished with the service through operations on the 
agent's web resources.  The detailed specification of these operations is spelled 
out in section 2.3.3.  In summary, these operations are, in order: 
1. The client sends a POST request to WR1, sending the DN of the identity 
to be delegated.  The agent creates WR2 and WR3 along with a public-
private key pair, and responds with the newly created WR2 URL.   
2. The client sends a GET request to the WR3 URL; the response is a 
Certificate Signing Request (CSR).   
3. The client creates a signed proxy certificate from the CSR and then sends 
the certificate via a PUT request on the WR4 URL (thereby creating that 
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resource, making its URL available for a GET request).  The server stores 
the certificate for later use by agent.   
(These three steps correspond to operations 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 2.) 
At any time after the PUT operation, the client may request that the certificate be 
deleted (section 2.3.2; see also operation 5 in Figure 2).  In the absence of such 
a request, it is left to the service implementer to decide for how long to keep the 
credentials stored.   
Note:  
Typical choices for how long to keep credentials include: 
 until the next restart of the service; 
 until the credentials expire and become invalid (as noted in the certificate); 
 forever. 
Delegating new credentials for an existing identity (represented by an existing 
WR2 URL) must in effect replace the credentials. 
2.3.2 Deleting a delegated identity and credentials 
A delegated identity exists if there is a corresponding WR2 URL that is available 
responds to a respond to a GET request.  A client can delete any delegated 
identity it has created by sending a DELETE request to the identity's WR2 URL.  
In response, the server will delete any stored proxy credentials for the identity 
and cause the WR2 URL, along with the URLs for its child resources (WR3 and 
WR4) to be unavailable.   
The client may make such a DELETE request before issuing the PUT request to 
the associated WR4 URL.  This in effect cancels the delegation process initiated 
with the first POST to WR1.  Regardless, the WR2, WR3, and WR4 resources 
are deleted and their URLs become unavailable.   
2.3.3 Operation specifications 
All four types of web resources must respond to HTTP GET with the 
representations described above in section 2.2.  Except for the requests 
described in the following sections, the agent must reject all other HTTP POST, 
PUT, and DELETE requests on any of the resources by returning the HTTP 
status, 403 “Forbidden”.  If any legal request should fail due to a problem on the 
server, it should return an appropriate HTTP status indicating a server error (i.e. 
a status of 500 or greater). 
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All the delegation web resources must be accessed via HTTPS; thus, their URLs 
must start with “https://”.  Authentication must use the TLS-with-client-certificate 
method [11].  The client certificate presented when the client-server connection is 
made identifies the base identity from which a proxy identity is to be created.    
Note:  
HTTPS also authenticates the server to the client.  This requires that the client have 
access to the CA certificate that was used to sign the server's credentials in order for 
the connection to be successfully established.  This document does not specify which 
CAs should be considered trustworthy by the client. 
Successful operations on the WR2, WR3, and WR4 URLs must be authorized to 
ensure that the identity of the client is the same as the identity responsible for 
creating WR2.  For the operation to be considered authorized,  the delegated 
identity's DN that serves as the representation for WR2 (see section 2.2) must 
match the DN of the EEC component in the authenticating certificate chain 
presented by the client.  If the DNs do not match, the agent must reject the 
operation request by returning an HTTP status of 403 “Forbidden”. 
2.3.3.1 WR1: the list of delegated identities 
An authenticated HTTP GET request to the WR1 URL shall simply return the 
representation of WR1 as described in section 2.2 as the body of the response. 
When the agent receives an authenticated HTTP POST to the WR1 URL, it shall 
create a delegated identity, represented by a new WR1 and based on the identity 
passed in the client's authenticating credentials. In particular, the agent must 
extract  the subject DN from the EEC component of the authenticating certificate 
chain sent to the URL; this DN will serve as the representation of the delegated 
identity.   
Note:  
It is important that the agent use the EEC's DN, without extra proxy CN components, 
as the representation of the delegated identity.  Since a client that authenticates with a 
proxy certificate will not typically use the same proxy certificate on every visit to the 
service (and thus the proxy DNs will not always have the same CN values), using the 
EEC DN allows the service to recognize a client that has visited the service previously.   
On creating the delegated identity on the server, the agent shall create and store 
an RSA key pair. The agent shall also create the child web resource WR3 
according to the specification in section 2.2. The agent shall return HTTP status 
201 “Created” and shall include in the response the HTTP header named 
Location whose value is the absolute URL of WR2 representing the created 
identity. 
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2.3.3.2 WR2: the delegated identity 
HTTP GET and DELETE operations must be supported on the WR2 URL.  
Successful operations on this URL must be authorized as described above in 
section 2.3.3.   
An authorized HTTP GET request to the WR2 shall return the DN associated 
with the delegated identity as described in section 2.2. 
An authorized HTTP DELETE request to the WR2 URL represents a request to 
delete the delegated identity from the server along with any associated 
credentials.  In particular, the agent shall delete the WR2 (by making its URL 
unavailable) along with all its child resources and the associated private key.   
If the client makes a GET or DELETE request on the WR2 URL before a 
successful POST request has been made on WR1 or after a successful DELETE 
request on WR2 or after the agent has otherwise deleted the delegated identity, 
the agent shall return an HTTP status of 404 “Not Found” (since the WR2 does 
not exist). 
2.3.3.3 WR3:  the certificate signing request 
The WR3 URL must only support GET requests; a successful GET on this URL 
must be authorized as described above in section 2.3.3. With successful  
authorization, the agent shall return a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to be 
converted to a properly signed proxy certificate by the client.  The certificate in 
the CSR must employ the public key that was created when the parent WR2 was 
created.   
If the client makes a GET request on the WR3 URL before a successful POST 
request has been made on WR1 or after a successful DELETE request on WR2 
or after the agent has otherwise deleted the delegated identity, the agent shall 
return an HTTP status of 404 “Not Found” (since the WR3 does not exist). 
2.3.3.4 WR4:  the proxy certificate 
HTTP GET and PUT operations must be supported on the WR4.  Successful 
operations on this URL must be authorized as described above in section 2.3.3.   
An authorized HTTP PUT to the URL for WR4, the certificate resource of an 
identity, shall upload a proxy certificate that the agent may use on the client's 
behalf to access other secured services. The uploaded certificate shall be sent 
as the body of the request message.  This request creates the WR4 as a 
resource, making its URL available for GET requests. The agent shall store this 
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certificate for its later use, and then respond to the client with an HTTP status of 
201 “Created”. 
An authorized HTTP GET request to the WR4 URL shall return the uploaded 
certificate as the body of the response message using the representation 
specified in section 2.3.2.  If a GET request to WR4 comes before a PUT request, 
the agent should return an HTTP status of 404 “Not Found” (since the resource 
does not technically exist until after a successful PUT).   
 
2.4 Using the delegated credentials 
The service which receives delegated credentials must authenticate the sender 
of any requests that would use those credentials. The sender must have the use 
of the identity from which the proxy credentials are derived or else the request 
shall be denied. 
Delegated credentials created via the service interface described in section 2.3 
must only be used within service interface implementations that are logically 
connected with the delegation service.  For services that are registered in an 
IVOA-compliant registry [12], section 3 spells out how a VOResource-formatted 
description of the secure service indicates the application interfaces that require 
delegation via proxy credentials created with an associated delegation service. 
Delegation credentials are valid only until the use-by time written into the proxy 
certificate; an attempt to use a proxy that has expired must result in an error. 
The agent shall only make use of delegated proxy credentials in response to 
authenticated requests that are compliant with the IVOA standard for 
Authentication Mechanisms [1].  When a client makes such an request to a 
secure service requiring delegated credentials, the agent must choose the saved 
proxy credential corresponding to the delegated identity that matches the client's 
authenticated identity.  In particular, the DN associated with the delegated 
identity must match the DN of the EEC component of the certificate chain used to 
authenticate the client.  (This is the same technique described in section 2.3.3. 
used to determine authorization.)  The agent must not use a proxy credential that 
does not match in this way.  It is up to the secure service to determine how to 
otherwise react when matching delegated credentials cannot be found:  it may 
fail with an error or continue operating without accessing any secondary secure 
services.   
Section 3.1 indicates how to describe a delegation service in an IVOA resource 
registry and indicate which service interfaces that proxies created via the 
delegation service may be used.  The implementation must restrict use of proxies 
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to only those interfaces so indicated in the description.  These interfaces must 
prevent access to the private keys by unauthorized agents, clients, or users. 
 
Note:  
Any process or user that has one of the private keys can, in principle, steal the 
corresponding delegated identity; thus, some care should be taken in storing them 
securely.  In a Java implementation, the delegation resources and stored credentials 
might be managed by one servlet and the science service that uses them by another. 
These servlets would occur in the same virtual machine and can pass credentials as 
objects in memory, never committing them to disc. This is generally quite secure 
enough. 
If the science code cannot receive the credentials from memory, then precautions  
against unwanted copying are needed.  Possible approaches include: 
 A shared file that is an encrypted key-store 
 Transfer via a MyProxy service, protected by TLS. 
3 Registration of the service 
A client can recognize a service that requires proxy credentials for delegation via 
its resource description in a resource registry [13].  When such a description is 
held in an IVOA-compliant registry (i.e. one that is compliant with the IVOA 
Recommendation for Registry Interfaces [13]), then its resource description will 
be in the form of a legal VOResource document [12] with the following 
requirements: 
 The root resource element has an xsi:type attribute set to “vr:Service” or 
one of its legal extensions.   
 The root resource element contains a <capability> child element with a 
standardID attribute set to “ivo://ivoa.net/std/Delegation” which 
describes the delegation interface.  No capability extension (identified 
via an xsi:type attribute) is required.   
 The delegation capability describing the delegation interface must contain 
an <interface> element with the role attribute set to “std”; that interface 
element must have an <accessURL> element whose value is the WR1  
URL and which has a use attribute set to “full”.   
When the delegation interface is described this way, then the service must use 
proxy credentials created via that interface only within other the interface 
implementations that are described within that same VOResource Service 
description and which indicate that delegation is required.  An interface indicates 
that delegation is required when the <interface> element includes a 
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<securityMethod> child element having a standardID attribute set to 
“ivo://ivoa.net/std/Delegation”. 
 
Note: a service resource indicates that a data access service requires delegated  
credentials by including a <securityMethod> element in the service's interface 
element: 
<capability> 
  <interface xsi:type="vs:ParamHTTP"> 
    <accessURL use="base">http://a.b.c/d/getData</accessURL> 
    <securityMethod standardID=”ivo://ivoa.net/std/Delegation”/> 
    <queryType>GET</queryType> 
    <resultType>text/xml</resultType>   
  </interface> 
</capabilty> 
The delegation service to use is described in the same resource record with its own 
capability description: 
<capability standardID=”ivo://ivoa.net/std/Delegation”> 
  <interface xsi:type="vs:ParamHTTP"> 
    <accessURL use="full">http://a.b.c/d/delegations</accessURL> 
    <queryType>POST</queryType> 
    <resultType>text/plain</resultType>   
  </interface> 
</capabilty> 
 
Appendix A.  Change History 
Since PR v1.0, 20090918: 
 Added abbreviation glossary (App. B) 
 Added figure 
 Added page numbers 
Since PR v1.01, 20080923: 
 Re-arranged information for improved readability 
 mandate TLS-with-client-certificate authentication only; drop mention of DN parameter. 
 Clarified Error status responses 
 An example of the various distinguished names in a delegation was added as 
commentary. 
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Appendix B.  Glossary of Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations are used in this document.  The page numbers 
indicate where the abbreviation is introduced.  Not included here are the 
acronyms defined in the preface section “Conformance related definitions.”. 
C – Country, a component of a distinguished name (DN) that identifies the 
country or origin for the thing being identified (p. 4).   
CN – common name, a component of a distinguished name (DN) that identifies 
the particular person, server, or other identity within some organization.  
The CN, when describing a person, will usually have the person’s full 
name.  Additional CN components may further qualify the identity for a 
particular context (p. 4).   
CSR – certificate signing request, a request to a party to create a certificate for a 
given identity and associated attributes and sign it with the private key 
held by the party (p. 5) 
DN – distinguished name, the globally unique name for the identity described in 
an X.509 certificate (p. 4).   
EEC – end-entity certificate, the X.509 certificate issued to a user intended to 
represent the user over the long-term.  In order to use it directly, the user 
must have the private key associated with the certificate.  An EEC 
contrasts against a proxy certificate which is short-lived (i.e. has a near-
term validity expiration) and created from an EEC in that the proxy is 
signed with the EEC’s private key (p. 4).   
HTTPS – the HTTP protocol sent over the TLS protocol.  In order to authenticate 
a web service query using X.509 certificates, HTTPS must be used (p. 5). 
MIME – Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, a standard for identifying used 
the type of data and (often) its format for the data being delivered in a 
message.  A “MIME-type” is a specific identifier used by HTTP to identify 
the specific type of data being passed (p. 7).   
O – Organization, a component of a distinguished name (DN) that identifies the 
institutional organization that the thing being identified is part of (p. 4).  
OU – Organizational unit, a component of a distinguished name (DN) that 
identifies the sub-group the thing being identified is a part of (p. 4).   
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PEM – Privacy Enhance Mail, a standard mechanism for encoding a data stream.  
X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests (CSR) are usually PEM 
encoded (p. 8). 
PKCS – public key cryptography standards, a set of standards for securely 
packaging and encrypting information to be passed over the network.  
PKCS#10 refers to a specific standard [4] often used to encode a 
certificate signing request (CSR; p. 8). 
REST – Representational state transfer, an approach to implementing and 
accessing web services based on four of the standard operations that are 
part of the HTTP protocol.  In the VO, “RESTful” services are often 
contrasted with SOAP-based services (p. 5) 
SOAP – Simple Object Access Protocol, a protocol for enabling remote 
procedure calls (execution of operations in software running on another 
machine).  The messages are formatted as XML and can be sent over a 
number of underlying protocols, HTTP being the most common one (p. 4). 
TLS – Transport Layer Security, a protocol for establishing a secure, 
authenticated connection between a client and a server.  Based on the 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), it authenticates both the client’s and the 
server’s identities using X.509 certificates presented by both sides (p. 3; 
see also [1], [2], and [3] for additional references and information). 
URL – Universal Resource Locator, the identifier that identifies a specific web 
resource.  It is intended that a URL can be resolved into a stream of data 
that represents the resource (p. 5).   
WR1-4 – an identifier used (solely) in this report to indicate one of the four web 
resources that must be implemented to be compliant with this service 
standard (p. 6). 
X.509 – a standard file/wire format for identity certificates based on public-private 
key encryption (p. 3) 
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